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A Preemption Analysis of California's Moratorium on
Nuclear Plant Construction: Pacific Legal
Foundation v. State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Commission
After cancelling plans for the construction of nuclear power
plants, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. and Southern California
Edison Co. challenged the validity of California legislation reg-
ulating nuclear power.' The utilities alleged that the restrictive
provisions of the California Nuclear Laws 2 and other sections
of the Warren-Alquist Act3 had forced them to abandon their
projects. Finding that the state statutes regulated radiation
hazards .associated with the use of nuclear power, the district
court held that the federal Atomic Energy Act 4 preempted the
challenged state provisions.5 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit6 re-
1. Warrren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Develop-
ment Act, ch. 276, § 2, 1974 Cal. Stat. 501 (codified as amended at CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981)).
2. CAL PuB. RES. CODE §§ 25524.1-.3 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). The Nu-
clear Laws, which imposed three independent moratoriums on the certification
of nuclear plant construction, were amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act.
Section 25524.1 applied only to proposals involving reprocessing of nuclear fuel
rods. Section 25524.2 imposed a moratorium effective until California deter-
mines that a federally approved method of nuclear waste disposal exists, see in-
fra note 57. Section 25524.3 required the California Energy Commission to
prepare a study on the feasibility of undergrounding and berm containment,
processes essentially burying nuclear facilities underground for safety pur-
poses, prior to certification of any proposed facilities.
3. CAL PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
5. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 489 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal. 1980). The district court invalidated Cali-
fornia Public Resources Code sections 25500, 25502, 25503, 25504, 25511, 25512,
25514, 25516, 25517, 25519, 25520, 25523, 25528, 25532, in addition to all of the Nu-
clear Laws. Id. §§ 25524.1-.3.
6. The Ninth Circuit consolidated two cases: the appeal from the utlities'
successful challenge of the California legislation, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 489 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.
Cal. 1980), and an appeal from a district court decision invalidating one of the
three moratoriums imposed by the California Nuclear Laws, Pacific Legal
Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 472 F. Supp.
191 (S.D. Cal. 1979). The Ninth Circuit remanded the latter case, reversing the
district court's summary judgment decision that the plaintiff had standing. Pa-
cific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659
F.2d 903, 911-14, 928 (9th Cir. 1981), petition for cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3861 (U.S.
April 20, 1982) (No. 81-1944).
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fused to consider the preemptive invalidity of most of the con-
tested statutes on nonjusticiability grounds.7 The court,
however, applied a preemption analysis8 to the California Nu-
clear Law that imposed a moratorium on the certification of
new nuclear facilities until California determined that a feder-
ally approved method of high-level nuclear waste disposal ex-
isted.9 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the state
legislature enacted the moratorium for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards and, consequently, that it
was not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. Pacific Legal
Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Develop-
ment Commission, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981).
Although it is clear that federal law has supremacy over
state law if the two are incompatible, 0 determining whether
the scope and extent of a particular federal law precludes or
preempts a state statute is often difficult."1 Federal preemption
7. 659 F.2d 903, 915-18. The court concluded that the first moratorium of
the Nuclear Laws, see supra note 2, and most of the challenged provisions of
the Warren.Alquist Act, see supra note 5, were not ripe for review. Id. It also
held that the controversy surrounding the third moratorium of the Nuclear
Laws was moot, because the study required by that provision had been com-
pleted. Id. at 917-18.
8. Id. at 919-28.
9. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977). The court also applied pre-
emption analysis to a requirement of the Warren-Alquist Act that utilities ap-
plying for certification of new nuclear projects submit three alternative sites for
the proposed facility. Id. § 25503 (West Supp. 1981). The court ruled that fed-
eral law did not preempt this provision. 659 F.2d at 925-26. Although many of
the same preemption issues apply to both state moratoriums and siting re-
quirements, this Comment will focus primarily on the moratorium. The federal
government accepts siting requirements more readily because of the states'
traditional zoning powers. Id. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
See generally Northern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 133, 390 P.2d 200, 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432, 436 (1964).
For general treatment of state power plant siting requirements and federal pre-
emption, see Henderson, The Nuclear Choice: Are Health and Safety Issues Pre-
empted?, 8 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 821 (1980); Note, Nuclear Power Plant Sit-
ing: Additional Reductions in State Authority?, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 439 (1976).
See also Granger & Wise, A Critique of One-Stop Siting in Washingto."
Streamlining Review Without Compromising Effectiveness, 10 ENvrvM L. 457
(1980).
10. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. The Supreme Court has used many expressions to describe the rela-
tionship of the invalidated state law to federal law: "contrary to; occupying the
field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtail-
ment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible
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clearly exists if a federal law explicitly prohibits concurrent
state regulation. If, however, no federal law expressly prohibits
a challenged state regulation, courts must determine whether
Congress implicitly intended to forbid state legislation. In an-
swering this difficult question, courts have used a two-part ap-
proach.12 Courts first consider Whether Congress has
prohibited all state regulation by occupying the field of regula-
tion in question.13 This form of preemption, referred to as oc-
cupation preemption,' 4 may be supported by the pervasiveness
or complexity of the federal regulation15 or the existence of a
constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analy-
sis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula." Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (footnotes omitted). The preemption decision
ultimately rests on an interpretation of the relevant federal statute and the
subject matter it regulates. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26
(1977).
12. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), the Supreme Court used a
one-part approach. See infra text accompanying note 21. Recently, however,
the Court has bifurcated the Hines test. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 524-26 (1976).
But cf. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317-19
(1981) (intimating a return to the Hines one-part preemption analysis). Al-
though the Hines formulation of the preemption test seems to incorporate both,
it has usually been cited as authority for only one part of the current two-part
test. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
13. In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), for example, the
Court held that the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 preempted
Washington state tanker-design standards. Id. at 160-68. The federal goals of
vessel safety, protection of the marine environment, and international regula-
tory cooperation indicated a congressional intention not to allow concurrent
state regulation, thus preempting all state tanker-design standards. Id. Using
similar reasoning, the Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
(1947), held that the United States Warehouse Act preempted all state regula-
tion of federally licensed warehouses. Id. at 234.
14. Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: California's Nu-
clear Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979). Profes-
sor Tribe has also referred to this form of preemption as "jurisdictional
preemption." L. TxmE, AMEIcAN CoNsTrruoNA LAw 377, 384 (1978).
15. E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947). The exist-
ence of independent federal regulatory agencies or federal licensing procedures
may, for example, indicate that the federal regulation is comprehensive. See,
e.g., Local 20, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (existence
of National Labor Relations Board supported preemption finding); First Iowa
Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946) (federal licens-
ing procedures of the Federal Power Act preempted state power project re-
quirements). But see Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)
(state air pollution standards imposed on federally licensed ships not pre-
empted). The pervasiveness or complexity of the federal regulation does not,
itself, prove preemption; it is relevant only to support finding congressional in-
tent to preempt. See New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 415 (1973). The pervasiveness of the federal regulation may also provide
some indication to the courts that a preemption decision will not create a legis-
lative vacuum. L TimE, supra note 14, at 385.
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dominant federal interest.' 6 Courts have used three factors to
establish the strength of the federal interest:' 7 whether Con-
gress has discouraged or promoted state regulation of the sub-
ject matter;18 whether the challenged legislation transcends
state lines;19 and whether the state judgment is based on
uniquely local factors, or factors common throughout the
country.20
Under the second part of the approach, courts consider
whether the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress." 21 This form of preemption, referred to as conflict
preemption,22 may occur if compliance with both state and fed-
16. Like the pervasiveness or complexity of the federal regulation, the
strength of the national interest is relevant only in considering the preemptive
intent of Congress. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976).
17. Maltz, The Burger Court, The Regulation of Interstate Transportation,
and the Concept of Local Concern: The Jurisprudence of Categories, 46 TENN.
L. REV. 406, 420-23 (1979).
18. Id. at 420. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445-
46 (1960); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 143, 152-53 (1851).
19. Courts should not defer to state legislation because of conceptions of
state sovereignty if the state imposes its judgment on other states. Maltz,
supra note 17, at 421-22 (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1950);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)). See also Note, A Framework
for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978). Cf. First Iowa Hydro-Elec.
Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946) (preempted state decision
affected national navigation systems).
20. If the state responds to a uniquely local situation, its judgment pre-
sumptively rests on local expertise and thus demands respect. If the state ad-
dresses a national situation, however, it may lack the necessary expertise to
entitle it to judicial deference. Maltz, supra note 17, at 422-23. Cf. Minnesota v.
NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (nuclear waste disposal problems are
common to all nuclear facilities).
21. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
22. Wiggins, supra note 14, at 42. Professor Tribe has alternatively called
this type of preemption "substantive preemption." L TamE, supra note 14, at
377.
As worded, the Hines test actually includes both conflict and occupation
preemption. Since courts will not find either form of preemption unless the
state contradicts congressional intent, both forms stand as an "obstacle" to the
objectives of Congress. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 377. Thus, the Court's
bifurcation of preemption analysis, see supra note 12 and accompanying text,
may be artificial and confusing. See infra notes 130, 136, 146. In Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), for example, the Supreme Court cited Hines as
precedent for the conflict preemption analysis. Id. at 526. Hines itself, how-
ever, seems to be better characterized as an occupation preemption case; the
Court invalidated a state alien registration law because the federal legislation
left no room for concurrent state regulation. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74
(1941). This does not mean that the Court was wrong in characterizing Hines
as a conflict preemption case, since the state law in that case did conflict with
the federal objective of precluding state regulation. It does show, however, that
the two lines of inquiry cannot be easily distinguished, and may be useful only
to the extent they involve separate policy considerations. See infra note 125.
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eral law is impossible,23 or if the state law frustrates a congres-
sional goal.24 The Supreme Court has intimated that conflict
preemption may not exist if the state and federal laws have dif-
ferent purposes, even though the laws appear to conflict.25
Under this exemption, however, the conflict must be only inci-
dental to the divergent purposes of the laws.2 6
In recent years, the Supreme Court has appeared less will-
ing to find either form of preemption,2 7 and has occasionally
suggested that there is a presumption against preemption.28
When considering occupation preemption, if the challenged
state legislation is in a field traditionally within the powers of
the states, the Court will not infer preemption unless that is
"the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 29 Similarly, the
Court has said that conflict preemption is inappropriate if chal-
23. See, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 633 (1962).
24. For example, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), the
Court concluded that a federal law preempted a California packaging law be-
cause the state law did not consider moisture variations, which frustrated the
intent of Congress to provide for proper consumer comparison.
25. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, Inc., 414 U.S. 117,
139 (1973) (holding no preemption partially because of different purposes); Hu-
ron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445-48 (1960) (state law to con-
trol air pollution not preempted by federal law to ensure safety of sea-going
vessels). Cf. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1978) (similarity
of purposes supports a preemption finding). Although the Court has never ex-
pressly endorsed this doctrine, several commentators have suggested that it is
an important factor in the preemption decision. See Tribe, California Declines
the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Preempted, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679,
688-92 (1978); Wiggins, supra note 14, at 50. Courts may have created the differ-
ence of purposes consideration to weigh conflicting policies under an otherwise
inflexible test. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Feder-
alism and the Burger Court, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 623, 628-30 (1975).
26. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir.
1971), a~fd mem., 405 U.S. 1035, (1972). In Northern States, the Eighth Circuit
rejected the state's difference of purpose argument since the purposes of the
state and federal law were "inextricably intertwined." Id. at 1153. Cf. Note,
supra note 25, at 629, 649 (difference of purpose preserves only "peripheral"
conflict from preemption).
27. See Note, supra note 25.
28. Determining whether these presumptions have ever affected the
Court's ultimate decision is difficult. The Supreme Court has not consistently
preserved state laws from preemption, even in cases in which the preemptive
intent of Congress was uncertain. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Trans. Co. v. Kalo
Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978).
29. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978). If the field of regu-
lation is traditionally national, however, the Court is less likely to presume the
validity of the state legislation. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 385-86 (citing North-
ern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), a fd mem., 405
U.S. 1035 (1972) (state regulation of nuclear power)). See also Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state regulation of aliens preempted).
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lenged state laws are not clearly repugnant to federal law.3 0
These presumptions insure that the federal-state regulatory
balance will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or
unnecessarily by the courts. 31
The federal government has regulated nuclear power since
the end of World War ]1.32 The federal monopoly over nuclear
science ended in 1954, when Congress, growing aware of the ex-
tensive nonmilitary value of nuclear science, passed the Atomic
Energy Act.33 Intended to encourage the development and use
of nuclear energy in cooperation with private industry,34 the
Act provided for the licensing of privately owned nuclear power
plants,35 and allowed private parties to possess, use, and trans-
fer nuclear materials.36 The Act tempered the goal of encourag-
ing the private development of nuclear power with a concern
30. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, Inc., 414 U.S. 117, 139
(1973). Preemptive conflict must be actual and substantial. See Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-92 (1974); New York State Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423 n.29 (1973).
31. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Courts may also be
reluctant to find preemption if invalidation of the state law would create a legis-
lative vacuum. Although it is less likely that there will be a resultant legislative
vacuum in conflict preemption cases, because the conflict itself indicates that a
vacuum will not result, if the laws have different purposes, see supra note 25
and accompanying text, a court may not wish to strike down a state law, leav-
ing its purpose unfulfilled. See Tribe, supra note 25, at 692 n.65. See generally
id. at 690.
32. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1976 & Supp. IM 1979)). Considering the state of nuclear
science following World War II "there was no reason to provide for or even to
contemplate state regulation of atomic energy." Murphy & LaPierre, Nuclear
"Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of
Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 395 (1976).
33. Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2282 (1976 & Supp. MI 1979)).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2013 (1976). The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
believed that
the goal of atomic power at competitive prices will be reached more
quickly if private enterprise, using private funds, is now encouraged to
play a far larger role in the development of atomic power .... [W] e
do not believe that any developmental program carried out solely
under governmental auspices, no matter how efficient it may be, can
substitute for the cost-cutting and other incentives of free and competi-
tive enterprise.
S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3456, 3459.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2141 (1976 & Supp I 1979).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2092, 2111 (1976). Section 2012 of the Act, however,
clearly stated that licensing of private industry did not divest the federal gov-
ernment of control over nuclear power. The licensing procedures, in fact, ex-
panded the responsibilities of the federal government by placing the




for public health and safety.3 7 Although the federal govern-
ment retained complete authority to regulate the nuclear in-
dustry, section 271 of the Act clearly provided that the states
retained their traditional authority to regulate the use of elec-
trical power, including power produced by nuclear facilities. 38
This authority encompassed the power to control the genera-
tion, local distribution, and intrastate transmission of
electricity. 39
The development of the private nuclear industry after the
passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 intensified state in-
terest in nuclear power regulation.40 To clarify the roles of
state and federal governments, Congress amended the Atomic
Energy Act in 1959 by adding section 274.4' Section 274(b) au-
thorizes agreements between the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) and states to .transfer regulatory authority over by-
product, source, and special nuclear materials to the states.42
Under these agreements, the states have authority to enact reg-
ulations for the "protection of the public health and safety from
37. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012(i), 2201(b) (1976). To eliminate the apparent con-
flict of interest between promoting nuclear power and limiting its use for safety
reasons, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 separated the regulatory and
promotional functions of the AEC. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
The Act transferred the power to regulate and license nuclear facilities to the
new Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and shifted responsibility for the
promotion of nuclear power and all other energy sources to the new Energy Re-
search and Development Administration (ERDA). Id. § 5801(a). By dividing
these sometimes conflicting functions, Congress hoped that the new federal
agencies could vigorously pursue their objectives while effectively monitoring
each other. See S. REP. No. 980, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5470. Congress has since transferred the functions of
ERDA to the Department of Energy. Department of Energy Organization Act
of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. 1I 1979).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or reg-
ulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the gen-
eration, sale, or transmission of electric power produced through the
use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission: Provided, That
this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or
local agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities
of the Commission.
39. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 129 F.2d 183,
194 (3d Cir. 1942).
40. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 32, at 398-99.
41. Act of September 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 1, 73 Stat. 688, 688-91
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976)). See S. REP. No. 870, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2872, 2875.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976). See also id. § 2014(e), (z), (aa) (definitions
of byproduct, source, and special nuclear material). The NRC has entered into
section 274 "turnover" agreements with twenty-six states. See U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 161.
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radiation hazards." 43 The AEC cannot, however, transfer all of
its authority. Section 274(c) requires continued and exclusive
federal authority over "more" hazardous materials and activi-
ties, including construction and operation of nuclear facilities,
export or import of byproduct, source, or special nuclear mate-
rial, disposal of nuclear wastes at sea, and disposal of other
hazardous materials that, according to the AEC, warrant fed-
eral licensing.44 Section 274(k) preserves state authority, in-
dependent of any agreement authorized under section 274(b),
to regulate "activities for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards."45
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota4 6 is the leading
federal preemption case dealing with nuclear power regulation.
In Northern States, the Eighth Circuit held that section 274 of
the Atomic Energy Act preempted a Minnesota law imposing
radioactive emission standards stricter than the AEC's stan-
dards.47 Concluding that "the states possess no authority to
regulate radiation hazards unless pursuant to the execution of
an agreement surrendering federal control ... authorized
under § [274] (b),"48 the Eighth Circuit reasoned that section
274 was an explicit demonstration of congressional intent to oc-
cupy the field encompassing the regulation of radiation
hazards.49 The court supported its finding of occupation pre-
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976). Prior to the execution of section 274(b)
agreements, the AEC retains the responsibility for regulating byproduct,
source and special nuclear materials. Absent an agreement, state regulatory
authority does not include protection of the public health and safety from radi-
ation hazards. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11, reprinted in 1959 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2872, 2879-80. The state must exercise its authority
under a section 274(b) agreement in a manner that is "coordinated and compat-
ible" with the federal regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(g) (1976). Both the legisla-
tive history of section 274 and the AEC's guidelines indicate that the state
standards are compatible only if they are virtually identical to the federal stan-
dards. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2872, 2879.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1976). Congress prevented transfer of regulatory
authority over these matters because it believed that the technical safety con-
siderations would be beyond the technical competence of the states. S. REP.
No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 34, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CoNr. & AD. NEWS
2872, 2874.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976) provides: "Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activi-
ties for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards."
46. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aOfd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
47. 447 F.2d at 1154.
48. Id. at 1149-50.
49. Id. at 1151. In addition to examining the statutory language itself, the
Eighth Circuit extensively referred to the legislative history of the 1959 amend-
ments, and cited, for example, a Senate report that said: "'[Section 274] is not
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emption by noting the pervasiveness of the federal regulationS0
and the need for uniform control of nuclear power regulation.5 1
Furthermore, the court noted that states might "be so overpro-
tective in the area of health and safety as to unnecessarily stul-
tify the industrial development and use of atomic energy." The
court recognized that this danger of conflict preemption might
upset the proper federally-determined balance between safety
and promotion.52
The California legislature's efforts to regulate the nuclear
industry intensified in 1974, when it passed the Warren-Alquist
Act.5 3 Aimed at ensuring a continued source of electrical
power for California,5 4 the Act requires state certification of
any new nuclear -facilities.55 In 1976, however, the legislature
enacted the Nuclear Laws, which contained three moratoriums
intended to leave any room for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction
by States to control radiation hazards by regulating byproduct, source, or spe-
cial nuclear materials."' Id. (citing S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, re-
printed in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2872, 2879 (comments of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy) (emphasis omitted)).
50. 447 F.2d at 1152-53. The Eighth Circuit cited authority describing the
federal regulation of nuclear power as "'extraordinarily pervasive, probably
more pervasive than any regulatory scheme considered by the Supreme
Court."' Id. at 1153 (quoting E. STASON, S. EsTEP & W. PiERCE, ATOMS AND THE
LAW 1059 (1954)). The court also referred to the comprehensive licensing pro-
cedures of the AEC. Id.
51. 447 F.2d at 1153-54. The court relied on 42 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976), which
recited congressional findings that the national interest requires federal regula-
tion of nuclear power.
52. Id. at 1154. But see Tribe, supra note 25, at 695 n.85.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat 685 (1977)
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7462 (Supp. 1I 1979)), which
gave states the authority to regulate radioactive atmospheric emissions, see in-
fra note 83, makes Northern States inapplicable to cases involving state regula-
tion of these emissions. A number of courts, however, have affirmed Northern
States's preemption analysis in cases involving other aspects of nuclear power.
See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 Ill. App. 3d 800, 284
N.E.2d 342 (1972); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976).
53. Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Develop-
ment Act, ch. 276, § 2, 1974 Cal. Stat. 501 (codified as amended at CAL PUB. REs.
CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981)).
54. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 25001-25008 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
55. The certification process is extensive and well-defined. Any utility con-
templating construction of a nuclear facility must file a notice of intention. The
notice may be approved only after extensive hearings and recommendations.
After approval of the notice, a utility must submit a proposal which, if approved
under a similar process, leads to certification of the project. Id. §§ 25500.25542.
In the notice and proposal, the utility must include three alternate sites for the
proposed facility, two of which must normally be acceptable to the California
Energy Commission. Id. §§ 25502-25504. See supra note 9.
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on the certification of new nuclear facilities.5 6 The Nuclear
Laws included a provision imposing a moratorium effective un-
til the California Energy Commission determines that a feder-
ally approved method of high level nuclear waste disposal
exists.5 7 The legislature enacted this moratorium, together
with the other provisions of the Nuclear Laws, as an alternative
to the California Nuclear Initiative, a voter referendum also
known as Proposition 15.58 Unlike the Nuclear Laws, Proposi-
tion 15 would have halted the further development and future
use of nuclear power until the California Assembly decided
that radioactive wastes could "be stored or disposed of, with no
reasonable chance" of adversely affecting the people or land of
the state.59 The enacted moratorium, however, put the primary
burden on the federal government to determine that the risks
of nuclear waste disposal were not unreasonable; California
only had to certify that the federal government made the requi-
site safety decision.60
56. Chs. 194-196, 1976 Cal. Stat. 3741 (codified as amended at CAL PuB. RES.
CODE §§ 25524.1-.3 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981)). See supra note 2 and accompany-
ing text.
57. Section 25524.2 provides in part:
No nuclear fission thermal power plant... shall be permitted land use
in the state, or where applicable, be certified by the commission until
(a) The commission finds that there has been developed and that
the United States through its authorized agency has approved and
there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal
of high-level nuclear waste.
CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). This was the only Cali-
fornia moratorium that the Ninth Circuit subjected to preemption analysis in
Pacific Legal Foundation. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
58. 659 F.2d at 924. The Nuclear Laws stipulated that they would be inef-
fective if the electorate passed Proposition 15, but due to the legislative action
the referendum was voted down. Id. at 924 n.33.
59. Nuclear Power Plants-Initiative Statute § 76503(b) (2), reprinted in THE
CALiFoRNIA NUCLEAR NlITIATIVE 217 (W. Reynolds ed. 1976). Unless the Califor-
nia legislature certified that all nuclear reactor safety systems were effective,
that permanent nuclear waste disposal was safe, and that the federal govern-
ment removed the limited liability granted the nuclear industry by the Price-
Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. 1T1 1980), Proposition 15 would
have prohibited certification of new nuclear facilities and would have required
the complete termination of existing California nuclear facilities by 1987. Bar-
ton & Meyers, The Legal and Political Effects of the California Nuclear Initia-
tive, in THE CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR ImTIAaE, supra, at 1-3. The Atomic Energy
Act might have explicitly preempted Proposition 15 because of the referen-
dum's purposeful regulation of radiation hazards. See Murphy & La Pierre,
supra note 32, at 445-50. But see Hays, State Power to Ban Nuclear Plants: The
California Initiative as a Case in Point, 6 ENvrL. L. 729 (1976) (preemption
analysis of Proposition 15).
60. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977). Section 25524.2(b) allows
the California legislature to overrule a California Energy Commission determi-
nation that a federally approved method of nuclear waste disposal exists. The
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The California legislature claimed that the objective of the
nuclear waste moratorium was economic, rather than safety-re-
lated.61 It argued that the absence of a federally approved, per-
manent disposal method for high level nuclear waste was a
"stipulated" economic problem because it created a "clog" in
the nuclear fuel cycle.62 This exposed the nuclear industry to
escalating costs for temporary storage and uncertain future ex-
penses.63 Because it eschewed a safety rationale and professed
to rely on an economic rationale, the California Assembly ar-
gued that its bill, in contrast to Proposition 15, regulated nu-
clear power for purposes other than protection against
radiation hazards. 64
The purposes underlying the California moratorium signifi-
cantly affected the Ninth Circuit's preemption analysis of the
Atomic Energy Act in Pacific Legal Foundation. After thor-
oughly treating the standing and justiciability issues, 65 the
court focused on two sections of the federal Act66 to determine
the field of occupation preemption.67 The court ruled that the
preemptive effect of section 274(c), mandating exclusive federal
authority over serious radiation hazards,68 is limited by sec-
tions 27169 and 274(k),70 which narrow the field of occupation
preemption to "regulations directed at radiation hazards."71
California legislature could conceivably conclude that the moratorium was still
effective notwithstanding federal approval, if the federal resolution of the issue
was not satisfactory to California. ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON RESOURCES, LAND
USE, AND ENERGY, REASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CALrFoRNIA 155 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as REASSESSMENT]. The California Assembly committee de-
scribed the moratorium in contradictory terms, making it unclear whether the
commission or the legislature, in certifying the federal approval, could examine
the propriety of the federal decision. Compare REASSESSMENT, supra, at 156
("ask only that a method be chosen and accepted by the federal government")
with REASSESSMENT, mupra, at 155 ("to the satisfaction of the State").
61. REASSESSMENT, supra note 60, at 18.
62. Id. at 18, 154. But see id. at 3, 12, 67-71 (contesting the seriousness of
the waste disposal problem by characterizing high-level nuclear waste disposal
as an "alleged" problem).
63. Id. at 27-28. California's economic rationale for the moratorium was de-
scribed only briefly and summarily.
64. Id. at 18.
65. 659 F.2d at 910-18. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
66. 659 F.2d at 920. The court focused on 42 U.S.C. §§ 2018, 2021 (1976). See
supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1976). See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976). See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The
court ruled that section 2018 permitted the states "to treat nuclear plants ex-
actly as they would all other power plants." 659 F.2d at 921 (citing 100 CONG.
REC. 12015-16, 12197-200 (1954)).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976). See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
71. 659 F.2d at 921.
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Noting the states' authority to regulate environmental 72 and ec-
onomic7 3 aspects of nuclear power, the court adopted the literal
language of section 274(k),74 and stated that state legislation
enacted for purposes other than protection from radiation
hazards is explicitly authorized.75
Turning to the California moratorium, the Ninth Circuit in
Pacific Legal Foundation discussed whether the law was a
purposeful regulation of radiation hazards.7 6 Contrasting the
waste disposal moratorium with Proposition 15, the court ac-
cepted the California Assembly committee's assertion that the
law dealt only with the "stipulated" economic problem of the
"clogged" fuel cycle, and not with any safety-related issues. 77
Since the California legislature designed the moratorium to ad-
dress the economic uncertainties of the nuclear fuel cycle, the
Ninth Circuit held that the moratorium did not purposefully
regulate radiation hazards and, therefore, was not in the field
preempted by Congress.78
The Ninth Circuit then considered whether the California
moratorium nevertheless conflicted 79 with the purposes and
objectives of the federal legislation.80 The court reasoned that
Congress limited the promotional goal of the Atomic Energy
Act by giving the states some regulatory authority in sections
72. Id. at 922. Prior to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4347 (1976), which required the NRC to consider environmental issues,
the AEC considered the states to have exclusive authority to enact environ-
mental regulations. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 531 & n.10 (1978); New Hampshire
v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 175-76 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
73. 659 F.2d at 923 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 550 (1978)). The Price-Anderson Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1980), however, restricts the states' ability to
regulate economic aspects of nuclear power because it limits liability for nu-
clear facilities.
74. See supra note 45.
75. 659 F.2d at 922. The Ninth Circuit conceded, however, that the federal
regulation would preempt a state law, even though the state law was enacted
for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards, if the two laws
were in direct conflict. "If the NRC required a nuclear plant to be constructed
in a certain way for safety reasons, for example, a state could not require the
plant to be constructed some other way for environmental reasons." Id. at 922
n.29. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
76. 659 F.2d at 923-25.
77. Id. at 924-25 (citing REAsSESSMENT, supra note 60, at 154). The Ninth
Circuit emphasized the lack of disagreement concerning the seriousness or
existence of the problem. Id. But see supra note 62.
78. 659 F.2d at 925.
79. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
80. 659 F.2d at 926-28. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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271 and 274(k).81 The court suggested that Congress has fur-
ther qualified its promotional objective by legislation enacted
since 1954. That legislation ensures a balanced approach to the
development of all energy sources 82 and explicitly permits
states to regulate certain aspects of nuclear power.83 Because
of these limitations on the promotional goal of the Atomic En-
ergy Act and the presumption supporting state legislation not
clearly preempted,84 the court ruled that the California morato-
rium did not conflict with the objectives of the federal legisla-
tion and, therefore, was a valid exercise of state authority.85
In defining the field of occupation preemption to include
only those state regulations enacted for the purpose of control-
ling radiation hazards,86 the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the
congressionally intended field of preemption. Although the lan-
guage of section 274(k) supports the court's emphasis of the
purpose of the California moratorium,87 the legislative history
of section 274(k) suggests that Congress intended to preempt a
broader range of state regulations. As initially proposed, sec-
tion 274(k) explicitly preempted any state law "concerning
[the] control of radiation hazards."88 Congress omitted this
81. 659 F.2d at 926.
82. To support this contention, the Ninth Circuit cited the Energy Reor-
ganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976 & Supp. MII 1979) (transfer-
ring the Commission's promotion function to ERDA), and the Federal
Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5901-
5917 (1976 & Supp. 11I 1979) (directing ERDA to develop and promote alterna-
tives to nuclear energy). 659 F.2d at 926-27. See also supra note 37.
83. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685
(1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-62 (Supp. 11 1979)),
allows states to regulate radioactive emission standards for nuclear plants, and
thus is one limitation on the ability of ERDA to promote the use of nuclear
power. See supra note 52. In fact, the NRC has acknowledged that states which
legislate under this Act may set standards that would prevent the operation of
nuclear plants. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Sta-
tion, Unit No. 2, ALAB-453), 7 N.R.C. 31, 34 & n.13 (1978). In addition, the NRC
Authorization and Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295, 94
Stat. 780 (1980), authorizes the states to impose nuclear facility siting and land
use requirements more stringent than those of the NRC. Id. § 108(f).
84. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 659 F.2d at 928. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
85. 659 F.2d at 926-28.
86. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 45.
88. S. 2568 & H.R. 8755, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Federal-State Re-
lationships in the Atomic Energy Field: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 486, 488 (1959) (emphasis added). The
proposal provided: "State laws and regulations concerning control of radiation
hazards from byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials shall not be ap-
plicable except pursuant to an agreement entered into with the Commission
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language because it wanted to allow the courts to make their
preemption decisions "in the light of all the provisions and pur-
poses of the Atomic Energy Act, rather than in light of a single
sentence."8 9 In this way, Congress intended to give courts a
"latitude of interpretation" to validate state legislation having
only an incidental effect upon the control of radiation
hazards.9 0 Thus courts arguably should not narrowly apply sec-
tion 274(k) by focusing only on the purpose of state legislation.
After ensuring that the legislative purpose is not to control haz-
ardous materials, the court should determine whether the stat-
ute has more than an incidental effect on the control of
radiation hazards.9 1
This occupation preemption test is consistent with the
"purpose" language of the statute, because consideration of
purpose or effect should result in the same conclusion. Most
state regulations of nuclear power enacted for "purposes other
than protection against radiation hazards"92 only incidentally
control such hazards, and would therefore be outside the
preempted field under either test. For example, state regula-
tions that apply to all energy sources, such as statutes gov-
erning siting, zoning, local pollution, or working conditions
unrelated to radiation concerns,93 would normally be enacted
89. A.R. Luedecke, General Manager of the AEC, explained the omission
as follows:
Our sole purpose was to leave room for the courts to determine the ap-
plicability of particular State laws and regulations dealing with matters
on the fringe of the preempted area in the light of all the provisions
and purposes of the Atomic Energy Act, rather than in light of a single
sentence.
For example, in the absence of the sentence, the courts might have
greater latitude in sustaining certain types of zoning requirements
which have purposes other than control of radiation hazards, even
though such requirements might have an incidental effect upon the use
of source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials licenses [sic] by
the Commission.
Id. at 500 (letter to Senator Clinton Anderson, Chairman, Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy).
90. Id. at 493 (statement of Robert Lowenstein of the General Counsel's
Office).
91. Cf. Tribe, supra note 25, at 702 ("[E]ven if the states were deemed to
be preempted from regulating nuclear energy activity for purposes of protec-
tion against radiation hazards, state regulations should not be considered pre-
empted if they implicate those concerns only incidentally."). Even the Ninth
Circuit in Pacific Legal Foundation seemed to recognize that state regulations
enacted for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards might
nevertheless be within the field occupied by Congress if they substantially con-
trolled radiation hazards. See supra note 75.
92. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
93. Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 251, 237 N.W.2d
266, 276 (1975). See Note, California's Nuclear Power Plant Siting Legislation:
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for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards
and would also tend to control these hazards only incidentally.
Regulations purposely enacted to control radiation hazards,
however, would usually do more than incidentally control such
dangers and would therefore be clearly preempted. Given this
substantial correlation and the legislative history of section
274(k),94 courts should hold that federal law preempts state
regulations that have more than an incidental effect on the con-
trol of radiation hazards, even though the state may have en-
acted its law for a different purpose.
The traditional occupation preemption considerations also
suggest that Congress intended that courts use this incidental
effects test to reach the preemption decision.95 The pervasive-
ness and complexity of federal regulation of nuclear power is
unquestionable; it is one of the few areas of regulation in which
the federal government began with exclusive authority.96
While Congress allowed states to exert more authority over the
nuclear industry and the electricity it produced,97 the federal
scheme of regulation also expanded and intensified.98 In au-
A Preemption Analysis, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1217-19 (1979). In using an in-
quiry into whether the statute applies to all energy sources or just to nuclear
energy as a factor in determining whether the law only incidentally controls ra-
diation hazards, the preemptive effect of section 274 would be similar to the
preemptive effect of section 271. See supra notes 38, 69.
94. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text. In Northern States, the
Eighth Circuit reasoned that the strength of the federal interest and the need
for a uniform national regulatory scheme supported a finding of preemption, see
supra notes 47-48, 50-51 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit in Pacific
Legal Foundation, however, failed to consider these traditional indicators of
congressional intent.
96. See supra notes 32-36, 50 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
98. For example, although the federal government has not determined how
to dispose of nuclear waste, federal legislation aimed at controlling these
problems has intensified. In addition to the provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 giving the AEC authority to regulate and to license byproduct and
special nuclear material (categories of nuclear waste), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(e),
2071-78, 2111-14 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979), Congress has also enacted other nuclear
waste legislation. E.g., Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7101-352 (Supp. I1 1979); Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(Supp I 1979)); Transportation Safety Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat.
2156 (codified in scattered sections of 45, 46, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. El 1979)); Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1981). Fur-
thermore, bills addressing the need to establish federally owned and operated
high-level nuclear waste disposal sites are currently pending in Congress. S.
1662, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S10440-46 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1981);
H.R. 3809, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), described in 127 CONG. REC. H2736-41
(daily ed. June 4, 1981). See also 10 C.F.R. §§ 30-36, 150.15(a) (4) (1981). See gen-
erally Hart & Glaser, A Failure to Enact: A Review of Radioactive Waste Issues
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thorizing these federal regulations, Congress expressed con-
cern for the entire nuclear power cycle, including whether
proposed regulations are economically unsound and whether
there are adequate plans for nuclear waste disposal.99 The
broad scope of federal nuclear regulation indicates that Con-
gress intended to preempt most state nuclear regulatory au-
thority, and intended to limit the broad exception of section
274(k) by requiring that state statutes falling under that provi-
sion no more than incidentally control radiation hazards.
The strength of the national interest in regulating nuclear
power also supports this interpretation of section 274(k).100
Congress has traditionally demonstrated a guarded attitude to-
ward state regulation of nuclear power. Congressional concern
has centered on the states' relative incompetence to regulate
adequately the complexities of nuclear power.Ol Although Cal-
ifornia may have avoided the scientific safety decision contem-
plated by Proposition 15, the very decision to invoke the
moratorium required a careful weighing of many complex fac-
tors. Moreover, California's judgment that the absence of a
demonstrated disposal method creates serious economic uncer-
tainties for the nuclear industry contradicts the findings of
Congress. 102 The interstate impact resulting from the state law
also creates an overriding national interest in regulating nu-
clear power. In an age of energy shortages and dependence on
foreign energy supplies, the development of nuclear power,
and Legislation Considered by the Ninety-Sixth Congress, 32 S.C.L. REv. 639
(1981); Jaksetic, Constitutional Dimensions of State Efforts to Regulate Nuclear
Waste, 32 S.C.L. REv. 789, 791-801 (1981).
99. See S. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6933, 6940-41 (Energy and Natural Resources Commit-
tee report on the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act). The NRC contin-
ues to view its responsibility for the regulation of nuclear power in broad
terms, suggesting a cost-benefit analysis of regulatory alternatives and consid-
ering future generations when deciding whether to license a nuclear facility be-
cause of its hazardous wastes. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, supra
note 42, at 1-2. These broad concerns guarantee that the preemption of state
laws enacted for such purposes will not result in the creation of a legislative
vacuum. See supra notes 15, 31.
100. The following analysis will roughly follow the three factors that Profes-
sor Maltz suggested for determining the strength of the national interest. See
supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 44.
102. In contrast to California's determination, the Senate Atomic Energy
Committee supported the "finding that technology for storage and disposal
which would provide reasonable assurance that waste can be safely disposed of
exists and is under development and that adequate disposal facilities can be
available when needed." S. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6933, 6941. See also S. 1662, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 101(i), 127 CONG. REC. S10440 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1981).
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now prevented in California, is increasingly becoming a na-
tional concern.10 3 California's moratorium not only imposes the
burdensome effects of a stifled California nuclear industry on
the energy producing capabilities of neighboring states, but it
also prevents the federal government from freely forming na-
tional energy policy. 0 4 Furthermore, concerns about high-level
nuclear waste disposal are not unique to California.105 Only
the federal government can resolve the problems associated
with high-level nuclear waste disposal.OS Hence, the legislative
history, pervasive federal regulation, and dominant national in-
terest indicate that Congress intended to allow states to enact
laws for purposes other than the control of hazardous materi-
als, but that these statutes must do no more than incidentally
control radiation hazards.
Under the incidental effects test, federal law arguably
preempts the California moratorium on the certification of nu-
clear facilities because the state law clearly has more than an
103. Congress passed the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5801-5891 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979), to help meet future energy needs. "The ob-
jective will be to exploit major existing sources of energy and to explore new
and advanced ways of producing energy, including consideration of, and re-
search on, closely associated environmental, economic, safety and conservation
factors." S. REP. No. 980, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5470, 5481. Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit in Pacific Legal
Foundation cited the Energy Reorganization Act to support a proposition that
the federal government was less concerned with the development of nuclear
energy than it had been in the past. 659 F.2d at 927. See supra notes 81-82 and
accompanying text; infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
104. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1153 (8th
Cir. 1971), affd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). See also Boskin & Gilbert, The Eco-
nomic Common Sense of Controlling Nuclear Power Development, reprinted in
THE CAIiFOERNA NUcLEAR IrTrATrvE, supra note 59, at 37, 38-48.
105. Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Despite this com-
monality of concern, local political pressure has compelled most states to enact
some form of legislation controlling the disposition of nuclear wastes. See, e.g.,
ARiz. REV. STAT. AN. § 30-691 (Supp. 1981-82); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 253
(1981); McH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.13505-06 (1980); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW
§ 1854-a.2 (McKinney Supp. 1981); Om. REv. STAT. § 469.525 (1981); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 70.98.080, 70.121 (1975 & Supp. 1980-81). These statutes and similar
laws in other states have already contributed to a myriad of state nuclear waste
regulations. See Jaksetic, supra note 98, at 824-49.
106. High-level nuclear waste is the radioactive material remaining after the
nuclear fuel is consumed by nuclear fission. With the exception of spent fuel,
which is essentially high-level waste capable of being reprocessed, nuclear fa-
cilities solidify high-level waste and transport it to the federal authorities for
storage. Currently, deep burial in stable geologic formations is the favored op-
tion in developing disposal technology because it reduces the danger of radio-
active leakage during the very long periods of necessary isolation. See M.
WIWmcH & R. LESTER, RADiOACTVE WASTES: MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION
(1977); Lucas, Nuclear Waste Management: A Challenge to Federalisim, 7 EcoL-
OGY L.Q. 917, 922-26 (1978).
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incidental effect in controlling radiation hazards. Unlike a state
regulation, such as a zoning ordinance, that might only inciden-
tally control radiation hazards,10 7 the moratorium bans all con-
struction of nuclear plants and thus directly minimizes the
radiation hazards they may produce. Whether the moratorium
is viewed as a general state regulation of nuclear power, impos-
ing another requirement on nuclear facility certification, or as a
specific regulation governing the disposition of high-level nu-
clear waste, the moratorium more than incidentally controls
the radiation hazards of nuclear energy. 0 8 Such energy spe-
cific state regulation'0 9 thus clearly intrudes into the field occu-
pied by Congress, since the moratorium contradicts Congress's
preemptive intent.
Even if the incidental effects test is rejected and the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of section 274(k) is adopted,1O the anal-
ysis in Pacific Legal Foundation still fails in two respects. The
court's primary error was its failure to recognize the real pur-
pose behind California's moratorium."' Although the Califor-
nia legislature purportedly acted on the basis of an economic
rationale, the legislature cannot easily separate the moratorium
from the public alarm over radiation hazards that provided the
impetus for Proposition 15, and, -ultimately, for the passage of
the moratorium." 2 The California Assembly committee that re-
viewed Proposition 15 and its legislative alternatives, including
the Nuclear Laws, viewed its task as a "reassessment" of the
use of nuclear power." 3 Noting the absence of nuclear waste
disposal methods, the committee recognized that conclusions
regarding the risk of high-level waste rested on "the degree of
trust one has in the speculations of the organizations and indi-
viduals on each side."" 4 The legislation actually enacted was
107. The AEC seemed to recognize that federal law might even preempt
zoning regulations that significantly controlled radiation hazards. See supra
note 89.
108. Cf. General Elec. Co. v. Fahner, Nos. 80-C-6835, 81-C-461, slip op. (N.D.
Ill. 1981) (state restrictions on high-level waste disposal in the state are within
the field preempted by Congress); Washington State Bldg.-& Constr. Trades
Council AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981) (same).
109. See supra text accompanying note 93.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 68-75.
111. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (Supreme Court re-jected purported health rationale to find state law discriminatory against for-
eign commerce).
112. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
113. See REASSESSMENT, supra note 60.
114. Id. at 31. As the committee explained:
To have confidence in the safety of a reactor, we must have confidence
in the degree of perfection man can attain in building and operating
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on a "middle ground;" the moratorium rejected shutting down
existing nuclear power plants, yet it did not allow further unim-
peded development.1 1 5 The legislature's economic rationale
thus obscures its real concerns regarding the radiation hazards
of nuclear power.116
The Ninth Circuit also failed to recognize that even the pro-
fessed economic rationale implicitly assumes that the state
must control radiation hazards. The legislature did not say that
nuclear power was uneconomical because the state had no
need for additional power facilities."-7 Rather, the state found
that nuclear power was uneconomical only because of the radi-
ation hazards associated with high level nuclear waste dispo-
sal." 8 That finding could not have been reached without
assuming the need for and conceptualizing control of these ra-
diation hazards.1 9 Whatever the wisdom of California's deci-
sion, it is a judgment for the federal government to make; it is
the federal government's sole responsibility and prerogative to
control radiation hazards.
The Ninth Circuit in Pacific Legal Foundation recognized
that conflict preemption would occur if the moratorium con-
flicted with the federal regulation of nuclear energy.120 Since
compliance with both the moratorium and federal law is not
impossible, preemption would result only if the moratorium im-
complex devices. To have confidence in the perpetual isolation of nu-
clear wastes, we must have confidence in the longevity of our social in-
stitutions and the rationality of future generations.
Id. at 95.
115. Id. at 103.
116. There are two possible reasons underlying the economic rationale of
the California legislature. The legislature may have established that rationale
mainly to take advantage of the language of section 274(k) or the growing rele-
vance of the "difference of purpose" factor in preemption analysis. See supra
note 25 and accompanying text. Professor Tribe acted as Special Counsel for
the legislature and was familiar with these legal issues. See Tribe, Memoran-
dum of Law on the Constitutionality of California's 1976 Nuclear Fission Ther-
mal Powerplant Legislation, in ASSEMBLY SUBCOMMrITEE ON ENERGY,
CONSTrmONA=rv OF CAUsOnu-sA's NUCLEAR LAws vii (1978), also printed with
modification as Tribe, supra note 25.
117. State decisions about the need for additional power facilities typically
occur on a case-by-case basis and are based on the economic impact of and
need for a particular proposed plant. See, e.g., CAL PuB. REs. CODE §§ 25511,
25514 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981) (California Energy Commission should consider
individual power plant applications in light of projected power needs).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
119. Significantly, the NRC's approach to resolution of the radiation hazards
of high-level nuclear waste disposal includes consideration of the economic im-
plications of potential solutions. See supra note 99.
120. 659 F.2d 903, 926-28 (9th Cir. 1981).
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peded the attainment of congressional objectives.'21 The objec-
tives of the federal regulation of nuclear power originally were
manifested in the AEC's responsibilities for the promotion of
the safe use and development of nuclear power as an energy
source. 122 The Ninth Circuit, in analyzing whether the morato-
rium conflicted with the promotional objective of the federal
regulation,12 3 erred both in its evaluation of the original extent
of that objective and the effect of subsequent federal legislation
on its validity.
Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to pro-
mote the development of nuclear power as a viable future en-
ergy source. 124 In Pacific Legal Foundation, the court stated
that sections 271 and 274 limited this promotional objective be-
cause they gave states authority to regulate nuclear power and
prevent faster growth of the industry.125 Section 271, however,
provided no authority for the states to regulate nuclear power;
Congress included it in the 1954 Act only to preserve traditional
state authority over the electricity produced in nuclear facili-
ties.126 It limited the federal government's promotional goal
only by allowing states to determine that their energy needs
were already adequately satisfied.127 Similarly, section 274(k)
did not grant the states significant authority to inhibit the
growth of nuclear power. Section 274(k) preserves only the
traditional authority that other provisions of section 274, and
not the Atomic Energy Act as a whole, might bring into ques-
tion.128 Even if section 274(k) preserves state authority from
121. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
123. 659 F.2d at 926-27. See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
124. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
125. 659 F.2d at 926-27. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. The
Ninth Circuit said that contrary language used by the Eighth Circuit in North-
ern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d at 1154, was dictum, since the chal-
lenged state regulation in Northern States was clearly within the field occupied
by Congress, and a conflict preemption analysis consequently was unneces-
sary. 659 F.2d at 927 n.39. Disposing of the Eighth Circuit's language in this
way, however, may be questionable not only because of the difficulty of clearly
distinguishing occupation from conflict preemption, see supra notes 12, 22; infra
notes 130, 136, 146, but also because occupation preemption is broader than con-
flict preemption. Since occupation preemption may invalidate even "comple-
mentary" state laws if they intrude into the exclusive federal field, that holding
should be classified as dictum rather than the Eighth Circuit's conflict preemp-
tion holding, which only invalidates those laws actually obstructing substantive
federal objectives. See Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal Pre-
emption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 95, 304-05 (1977).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976). See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 45. The Ninth Circuit in Pacific Legal Foundation
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the contrary implications of other sections of the Act, its pro-
tection of only those state regulations that have an incidental
effect on control of radiation hazards129 make it much like the
grant of section 271, and thus not a serious limitation on the
federal Act's promotional objective.130
Federal legislation subsequent to the Atomic Energy Act
also does not defeat, or even substantially diminish, the federal
government's promotional objective. Except for the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977 and the NRC Authorization Act of
1980,131 federal legislation plainly supports the further develop-
ment of nuclear power.132 These two acts and the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act'33 were not intended to display
any lack of congressional confidence in nuclear energy.134 In-
stead, they recognized that the nation must progress in devel-
oping all energy sources to maximize domestic energy
production.135 This legislation does not support California's de-
cision to prevent the further development of a substantial en-
ergy source. 136
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977137 authorized states
to impose air pollution standards that could close nuclear facili-
seemed to recognize that the grant of authority in section 274(k) did not con-
clusively settle the preemption question. See supra note 75.
129. See supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
130. At this point the considerations relevant to occupation and conflict pre-
emption meet. If section 274(k) preempts only state regulations enacted for the
purpose of controlling radiation hazards, as the Ninth Circuit suggested, then it
would limit the possibility of conflict preemption, because a relatively broad
grant of authority would significantly compromise the federal promotional
objective.
131. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
132. See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-91 (1976 &
Supp. IH 1979); Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5901-17 (1976 & Supp. Il 1979). See also supra notes 37, 82.
133. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1981).
134. The Ninth Circuit viewed this federal legislation as compromising the
promotional goal originally implicit in the Atomic Energy Act. See 659 F.2d at
926-27.
135. E.g., S. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6933, 6940-41. ('The national need for sufficient en-
ergy depends upon a diverse base of primary energy sources which compete on
an equal footing and ... absent a program for waste storage and disposal nu-
clear energy cannot so compete.") (Senate comments accompanying Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act). See also supra note 103.
136. Again, the occupation and conflict preemption lines of inquiry stand on
the same ground. See also supra note 130. The federal government's interest in
securing a potential energy supply for the nation is a strong factor in defining
the field of occupation preemption, and now in establishing the objectives to be
considered in a conflict preemption analysis.
137. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7462 (Supp. I 1979)).
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ties,1 38 and thus indicates a congressional limitation on the pro-
motional objective of nuclear energy. The scope of that Act,
however, is narrow, suggesting that Congress has not aban-
doned the promotional objective altogether, but has empha-
sized the safety objective in regulating the carefully
circumscribed area of radioactive air pollution. 39 It is pre-
sumptuous to contend that this limited federal legislation de-
stroys a long-standing promotional objective indirectly affirmed
by other recent legislation.140 California's moratorium unques-
tionably inhibits further development of nuclear power in Cali-
fornia, and thus is an obstacle to attaining the federal
promotional objective.'41 This obstruction of a federal objective
puts the state law in preemptive conflict with federal law.
The Ninth Circuit in Pacific Legal Foundation failed to dis-
cuss one consideration that may mitigate this apparent pre-
emptive conflict. The Supreme Court has indicated that in
some circumstances different purposes behind state and fed-
eral laws may prevent preemptive conflict. 42 Assuming that
the California moratorium rested on the purported economic
rationale,1 43 and that federal regulation does not rest on eco-
nomic concerns,1 44 federal and state regulations would have
different purposes. Yet the difference of purpose consideration
applies only if the conflict is incidental. 45 By halting all new
construction of nuclear plants, the California moratorium sig-
nificantly conflicts with the federal law's promotional goal, and
completely nullifies one of Congress's objectives. Thus, the dif-
ference of purpose consideration should not exempt Califor-
138. See supra note 83.
139. The same argument is applicable to the interpretation of the NRC Au-
thorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295, 94 Stat. 780, which authorizes the
states to impose nuclear facility siting and land use requirements more strin-
gent than those of the NRC. The law's limitation on the promotion of nuclear
energy only represents a federal decision that in this specific area the proper
balance has moved close to the safety objective.
140. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 45.10, 51.01-.02
(4th ed. 1973) (a revision of Sutherland Statutory Construction).
141. Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1978) (NRC not required by the Atomic Energy Act to suspend licensing activi-
ties until waste disposal methods are approved).
142. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
143. But see supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
144. Recent federal legislation, however, seeking to develop all energy
sources may rest primarily on an economic decision of Congress that in the
long run this development is necessary for a healthy and independent national
economy. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. Other federal legisla-
tion, such as the Price-Anderson Act, see supra note 73, also clearly rests on
economic concerns.
145. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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nia's law from invalidation because of conflict preemption.14 6
Finally, "state supportive presumptions" against finding
preemption do not make preemption of the California morato-
rium inappropriate.147 The absence of traditional state author-
ity over nuclear energy regulation148 ensures that defining
occupation preemption to invalidate all state laws more than
incidentally controlling radiation hazards does not impose a ju-
dicial interpretation that Congress did not intend. Moreover,
the strong federal interest in domestic energy production,
which supports a finding of conflict and occupation preemp-
tion,14 9 guarantees that conflict preemption of the California
moratorium will not unnecessarily foreclose state regulation.150
In affirming California's decision to halt nuclear power de-
velopment until the federal government approves a method of
high-level nuclear waste disposal, the Ninth Circuit in Pacific
Legal Foundation tipped the scales of federalism toward in-
creased state authority. In this failure to find federal preemp-
tion, the Ninth Circuit subjected important national interests to
the dictates of state decision-makers. California's moratorium
provision prevents a balanced national approach to satisfying
increasing energy needs, and imposes on other states the bur-
den of readjusting their own energy consumption patterns. Pa-
cific Legal Foundation encourages other states to regulate
nuclear power and nuclear waste disposal, making possible a
myriad of state regulations that will drastically affect national
energy policy. These inevitable consequences do not necessar-
fly indicate that California's moratorium on nuclear power de-
velopment was unreasonable; it may be advisable to postpone
further expansion of the nuclear industry until the uncertain-
146. For the third time, the considerations relevant to conflict preemption
have mirrored occupation preemption considerations. See supra notes 130, 136.
In this instance, the difference of purpose consideration rests on two factors:
whether the overlap between federal and state laws is only incidental, the very
test recommended in the occupation preemption analysis, see supra text ac-
companying note 94, and whether the difference of purposes indicates that a
preemption holding would result in a judicially created legislative vacuum, also
a consideration in the occupation preemption analysis. Preempting the Califor-
nia moratorium will not likely result in the non-regulation of nuclear waste dis-
posal or the economics associated with such disposal See supra notes 98-99
and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
148. The traditional state authority that Congress recognized in section 271
of the 1954 Act encompassed only a state's authority to regulate the power pro-
duced in nuclear facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976). See supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text.
149. See supra note 136.
150. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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ties of nuclear waste disposal are remedied. Nevertheless,
Congress has indicated that the federal government must make
that decision. Both the occupation and conflict theories of pre-
emption invalidate California's moratorium.
